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ADMIT OR DENY:  A CALL FOR REFORM OF THE SEC’S
“NEITHER-ADMIT-NOR-DENY” POLICY
Priyah Kaul*
For four decades, the SEC’s often-invoked policy of settling cases without requiring
admissions of wrongdoing, referred to as the “neither-admit-nor-deny” policy, went
unchallenged by the courts, the legislature, and the public. Then in 2011, a
harshly critical opinion from Judge Jed Rakoff in SEC v. Citigroup incited de-
mands for reform of this policy. In response to Judge Rakoff’s opinion, the SEC
announced a modified approach to settlements. Under the modified approach, the
Commission may require an admission of wrongdoing if a defendant’s misconduct
was egregious or if the public markets would benefit from an admission. Many
supporters of the neither-admit-nor-deny policy argue that it is the most efficient way
to compensate harmed investors. In contrast, many critics condemn the ministerial
role of the judiciary in approving SEC settlements. Other interested parties express
uncertainty about how aggressively the SEC will pursue admissions under the mod-
ified approach and whether admissions will have collateral estoppel effects in
subsequent private litigation. Both supporters and critics are mistaken in their ap-
proach to the policy, and those in the third category are justifiably uncertain. This
Note emphasizes the need for an overhaul of the neither-admit-nor-deny policy, ar-
guing that the policy is plagued by ambiguity, affords too much discretion to the
SEC, and does not sufficiently punish wrongdoers. As a result of its use of the
neither-admit-nor-deny policy, the SEC fails to achieve the objectives of trans-
parency, accountability, and deterrence that are paramount to enforcing federal
securities laws. By requiring specific admissions of wrongdoing in settlements and
limiting the preclusive effect of those admissions in private litigation, the SEC
would adopt a more aggressive and disciplined approach to enforcement—better
serving the public interest—without the risk of costly litigation with defendants
who refuse to settle.
INTRODUCTION
In a collection of essays published in 1914, Justice Louis Brandeis
penned the well-known line, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light, the most efficient policeman.”1 The United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Com-
mission”) often invokes this line to justify its regulatory practices,
which encourage public companies to be more transparent with
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1. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT, 92 (2d ed.
1914).
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their shareholders.2 Interpreted more broadly, transparency and
openness are powerful principles to ensure the appropriate func-
tioning of the SEC’s enforcement arm as well.
The modern SEC Division of Enforcement was formed in 1972 in
response to the need for a single, consolidated division focused on
enforcement and investigation of securities law violations.3 In the
decades since, the Division of Enforcement has become one of the
most reputable pillars of the SEC. More specifically, the Division of
Enforcement is often praised for efforts in pursuit of its mission, “to
protect investors and the markets by investigating potential viola-
tions of the federal securities laws and litigating the SEC’s
enforcement actions.”4
And yet, the Division of Enforcement almost never litigates. In-
stead, it settles. Since 2002, the SEC’s settlement rate has remained
constant at about ninety-eight percent, with the Commission going
to trial in only twenty-two of the 734 cases it filed in 2012.5 There is
little comprehensive data on SEC settlement practices prior to
2002, but at various times during this period, the Commission pub-
licly acknowledged settling “the vast majority of its cases.”6
If the staggering number of settled cases does not expose a fun-
damental cause for concern, the most common method of
2. John Coffee Jr., The End of Phony Deterrence? ‘SEC v. Bank of America’, N.Y. L. JOURNAL
(2009), available at http://www.law.com/cs/ContentServer?pagename=pubs/nylj_07/wrap-
per&childpagename=NY/Article_C/pubs/nylj_07/
pubarticlePrinterFriendly&cid=1202433880823.
3. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History
and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 372-75
(2008).
4. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement Manual (Oct. 9,
2013) at 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
5. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n., Remarks Before the 20th
Annual Securities and Regulatory Enforcement Seminar (Oct. 25, 2013) available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540071677#_edn47. In a letter to Senator
Elizabeth Warren in June 2013, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White stated that seventy percent of
the 105 financial crisis-related actions filed against individuals were filed as litigated actions.
See Letter from Chairman Mary Jo White to Senator Elizabeth Warren, June 10, 2013, http://
thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/WARREN-Settling-Enforcement-Action-
ES144264. This statistic may be misleading. Since settlement can occur at any point in the
pre-trial process, many cases “filed as litigated actions” will settle before any serious threat of
trial. Furthermore, the SEC attributes the increase in litigation from 2012 to 2013 to a wave
of complex cases related to the 2008 financial crisis, rather than a permanent or significant
shift in SEC policy or practices.
6. Aulana L. Peters, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Washing-
ton Bar Ass’n. (Apr. 17, 1985) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1985/041985
peters.pdf; Mary L. Schapiro, Former Commissioner, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n., Remarks
Before the 20th Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 20, 1993) available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/012093schapiro.pdf (describing that the SEC “instituted
approximately [seventy-four] cease-and-desist actions [that year] . . . almost all of which
[were] settled by consent.”).
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settlement certainly does. The SEC settles most of its cases via con-
sent decree, in which a defendant accepts monetary and injunctive
penalties without admitting to or denying the allegations.7 The con-
sent decree process is far more opaque than a civil trial, in which
parties argue their positions in a public forum and accept the judg-
ment as established by the proceedings.8 Furthermore, a neither-
admit-nor-deny consent decree, which only contains a brief state-
ment of the allegations and settlement terms, does not expressly
require the defendant to take responsibility for wrongful conduct
by admitting the truth of the allegations.9 The SEC’s use of consent
decrees communicates to potential wrongdoers that they will rarely
face the adverse consequences of an admission.10 This Note pro-
poses replacing neither-admit-nor-deny with a settlement policy
that better achieves the paramount public interest objectives of
transparency, accountability, and deterrence.
This Note consists of three parts. Part I will provide background
information on the neither-admit-nor-deny policy, including the
SEC’s justifications for and evolving use of the policy. Part II will
discuss the need for reform, addressing weaknesses in the current
policy. Finally, Part III will propose a reform to the policy that re-
quires the SEC to obtain specific admissions of wrongdoing in all
settlements and limits the preclusive effect of admissions in subse-
quent private litigation. This Note argues that such a policy will
improve the transparency, accountability, and deterrence achieved
through SEC enforcement, while mitigating concerns about the
costs of risky litigation with defendants who refuse to settle.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE NEITHER-ADMIT-NOR-DENY POLICY
A. Adoption and Codification of Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
The SEC traces the neither-admit-nor-deny policy to a 1972 re-
lease entitled “Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative
Proceedings.”11 In the release, the SEC provided express approval
for the Division of Enforcement to settle cases on the basis of the
7. Danné L.Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-interest or Public Interest, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 647 (2007).
8. See Luis A. Aguilar, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Setting Forth Aspirations for 2011 (Feb.
4, 2011) available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540071677#_
edn41.
9. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 647.
10. See id.
11. Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Rel. No.
33–5337 (Nov. 28, 1972). See also S.E.C. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308
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defendant neither admitting nor denying the allegations in the
complaint. The history of this practice is more complex and deeply
entrenched, however, than references to the 1972 release suggest.12
According to the Second Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Vitesse, the SEC
began entering into neither-admit-nor-deny consent decrees well
before 1972.13 At the time, the SEC had limited ability to obtain
compensatory damages.14 Instead, it focused on injunctive relief, re-
gardless of whether it obtained an admission of wrongdoing. The
consent decree was a useful tool for obtaining injunctive relief from
defendants who violated federal securities laws on multiple occa-
sions. If a defendant settled via consent decree and then violated
the federal securities laws again, the SEC could invoke the consent
decree and employ the court to hold the defendant in contempt.15
Through the mechanism of the consent decree, the SEC faced al-
most no barrier to penalizing repeated misconduct.16
By 1972, defendants began to take advantage of the SEC’s settle-
ment practices. After settling by consent decree, many defendants
would publicly deny the SEC allegations and claim that they had
entered into settlements only to avoid litigation with a powerful ad-
ministrative agency.17 The SEC grew concerned that such
statements created a perception that the Commission was imposing
sanctions when the alleged conduct did not occur.18 The SEC saw
this perception as detrimental to its integrity.19 In response, the
SEC released its official approval of the practice and codified the
policy in 17 CFR Section 202.5(e),20 adding one important modifi-
cation. The release and subsequent codification required that
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing a footnote to the SEC’s letter brief to the court referencing the 1972
release).
12. See Vitesse, supra note 11, at 308.
13. Id.
14. Id.





20. See 17 CFR § 202.5(e); U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, About the CFR,
available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/about.html. The Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) is an annual codification of the rules of executive departments and agen-
cies of the federal government. The provision in its entirety reads:
The Commission has adopted the policy that in any civil lawsuit brought by it or in any
administrative proceeding of an accusatory nature pending before it, it is important to
avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an impression that a decree is being en-
tered or a sanction imposed, when the conduct alleged did not, in fact, occur.
Accordingly, it hereby announces its policy not to permit a defendant or respondent
to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allega-
tions in the complaint or order for proceedings. In this regard, the Commission
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consent decrees include a provision in which the defendant agreed
“not to take any action or to make or permit to be made any public
statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the com-
plaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without
factual basis.”21 This provision allowed the SEC to obtain settle-
ments that would not be subsequently disavowed.
Although the policy limited the defendant’s ability to publicly ad-
dress the allegations, it expressly left open the defendant’s ability to
take a different legal and factual position in proceedings to which
the SEC was not a party.22 As a result, defendants welcomed the
policy. It allowed them to continue to disavow wrongdoing in subse-
quent private litigation, where the monetary penalties could be
extremely high.23
B. SEC v. Citigroup and Judicial Criticism of Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
Although SEC consent decrees receive judicial review, federal
district courts did not challenge the SEC’s settlement practices for
over four decades.24 Civil settlements typically receive judicial re-
view when either the parties or  non-party beneficiaries may be
vulnerable or at risk.25 SEC consent decrees may bind non-party vic-
tims of the alleged wrongful conduct.26 Therefore, they fall into the
second category of cases receiving judicial review.27 Although a
believes that a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the
defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations.
21. 17 CFR § 10, App. A to Part 10: Commission Policy Relating to the Acceptance of
Settlements in Administrative and Civil Proceedings.
22. Notwithstanding the agreement not to make public statements denying the allega-
tions, the SEC acknowledges that defendants often “have no difficulty getting the word out
that they are still denying the allegations” through the use of strategic press releases, which
may subtly suggest that the conduct at issue was not that serious or that the SEC over-reacted.
Aguilar, supra note 8.
23. See Vitesse, supra note 11, at 309.
24. See S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1984).
25. Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., The Expanding Role of Judges in Settlement and Beyond,
10 THE MAYHEW-HITE REPORT ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE COURTS (May 2012) available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/2012/05/the-expanding-role-of-judges-in-
settlement-and-beyond. Criminal plea bargains, for example, fall into the first category of
exceptions, because the defendant is likely to be a “vulnerable party” in negotiating the
settlement.
26. Id. But see S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 2014)
[hereinafter Citigroup II] (“[A] consent decree does not pose the same concerns [as class
action settlements] regarding adequacy – if there are potential plaintiffs with a private right
of action, those plaintiffs are free to bring their own actions”).
27. See Thomsen, supra note 25. Both federal district judges and administrative law
judges may preside over this process.
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judge reviewing an SEC consent decree must exercise independent
judgment, the judge’s only sources of information are the com-
plaint and the proposed order.28 As a result, the entry of the
consent judgment is largely ministerial.29 Courts must generally ap-
prove the consent decree if it is “fair and reasonable.”30 Most courts
grant broad deference to the SEC when applying this standard.31
The routine judicial approval of no-admission consent decrees
came to a partial halt in late 2011. In a searing opinion, Judge Jed
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York rejected a proposed
$285 million settlement between the SEC and Citigroup Global
Markets.32 The court found that the consent decree was “neither
fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”33
Judge Rakoff’s opinion marked the beginning of a turning point
for neither-admit-nor-deny.34 The crux of his opposition to neither-
admit-nor-deny was what he viewed as the ministerial role of the
courts in approving consent decrees. According to Judge Rakoff,
expecting the judiciary to impose substantial injunctive relief with-
out knowing the underlying facts of the case was an “inherently
dangerous” practice.35
After Citigroup, other judges followed the lead of Judge Rakoff by
expressing concern about the policy. For example, Judge Rudolph
Randa of the Eastern District of Wisconsin cited Citigroup in re-
jecting a proposed SEC settlement.36 He requested that the SEC
28. See Amanda S. Naoufal, Is Judge Rakoff Asking for Too Much? The New Standard for
Consent Judgment Settlements with the SEC, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 183, 185 (2012).
29. See S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2011),
vacated and remanded, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Citigroup I].
30. Citigroup II, supra note 26, at 295. If the consent decree includes injunctive relief,
district courts must also determine that the “public interest would not be disserved” by entry
of the consent decree. Id. at 296.
31. Id. at 293.  (“Our Court recognizes a ‘strong federal policy favoring the approval and
enforcement of consent decrees.’”).
32. See Citigroup I, supra note 29.
33. Id. at 332. The Southern District of New York considered whether the consent de-
cree was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Adequacy was omitted from the standard for
consent decree approval when the Second Circuit considered the case on appeal. Citigroup II,
supra note 26.
34. See Citigroup I, supra note 29. Citigroup I was not Judge Rakoff’s first public criticism of
the neither-admit-nor-deny policy. See S.E.C v. Bank of Am. Corp. 653, F. Supp. 2d 507, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (claiming the consent decree “was a contrivance designed to provide the
SEC with a facade of enforcement” and could not be considered fair even under the most
deferential review); see also Vitesse, supra note 11 (stating that neither-admit-nor-deny results
in “confusion and hypocrisy”). The sentiment behind these two decisions culminated in
Judge Rakoff’s impactful opinion in Citigroup I.
35. Citigroup I, supra note 29, at 333.
36. See Letter from Hon. Rudolph T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, to Andrea R. Wood &
James A. Davidson, Counsel for SEC (Dec. 20, 2011), available at www.wlrk.com/docs/kosslet-
ter.pdf.
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provide additional information showing why the settlement was
“fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.”37 Judge Randa ulti-
mately approved the no-admission consent decree. Then in 2013,
Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York noted
that he was “troubled” by a neither-admit-nor-deny settlement pro-
vision, expressly conditioning his judgment on the outcome in the
Citigroup appeal.38.
The Second Circuit handed down its decision in the Citigroup ap-
peal on June 4, 2014.39 It vacated the district court’s order, finding
that the court abused its discretion by requiring the SEC to estab-
lish the “truth” of the allegations.40 The Second Circuit also held
that district courts should not consider the adequacy of a consent
decree involving an enforcement agency.41 On remand, Judge
Rakoff approved the consent decree but expressed concern that fu-
ture consent decrees would be “subject to no meaningful oversight
whatsoever.”42
Although the Second Circuit reaffirmed the SEC’s broad discre-
tion to enter into consent decrees, district courts continue to
disagree.43 This recent jurisprudence with respect to SEC consent
decrees demonstrates the uncertainty and instability of the
doctrine.
C. SEC Responses to Judicial Criticism of Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
1. SEC Justifications for Settling instead of Litigating
In response to Judge Rakoff’s first opinion in Citigroup and the
discontent that it fostered, the SEC made a series of public state-
ments defending its reliance on settlement instead of litigation.44
37. Id.
38. S.E.C. v. CR Intrinsic Investors, 939 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013).
The Citigroup I settlement was later vacated and remanded. See Citigroup II, supra note 26. The
proposed $602 million settlement in CR Intrinsic Investors was consequently approved. S.E.C.
v. CR Intrinsic Investors, No. 12-CV-8466 VM, 2014 WL 2768054, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
39. Citigroup II, supra note 26.
40. Id. at 295. The court also found abuse of discretion to the extent that the lower court
withheld approval of the decree because it believed the SEC failed to bring the proper
charges. Id. at 297.
41. Id. at 294.
42. S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., No. 11-CV-7387 JSR, 2014 WL 3827497, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Citigroup III].
43. Id.
44. See Robert Khuzami, Former Director, Div. of Enforcement, Sec. Exch. Comm’n.,
Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference (Dec.
1, 2011) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch120111rk.htm (defending
the SEC’s settlement policies).
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The SEC frequently invokes three core justifications for settlement.
First, the SEC argues that litigation is an expensive and resource-
intensive process for an administrative agency with limited funding
and staff. The SEC reasons that the expenditure of resources at trial
is better allocated to investigating another fraud.45 Second, the
Commission claims that settlement is an expedited means of re-
turning funds to harmed investors.46 Third, the SEC prefers
settlement because it offers certainty to harmed investors by elimi-
nating the possibility of losing at trial.47
Although the SEC favors settlement for these reasons, SEC Chair-
man Mary Jo White acknowledges that litigation results in certain
benefits, including greater transparency and a “more thoughtful
and nuanced” examination of the conduct and laws at issue.48 The
SEC claims to weigh the costs and benefits of settlement and litiga-
tion on a case-by-case basis.49 Its stated policy is to only recommend
settlement when it believes that the terms of settlement are rela-
tively equivalent to a reasonable outcome of prevailing at trial.50 In
making its determination, the SEC purports to consider the
strength of its case, the delay and resources required for a trial, the
benefits of returning money to harmed investors quickly, the
chances of losing at trial, and the chances of winning but being
awarded less than what the settlement achieves.51 Given these con-
siderations and assuming that risk-adjusted expected compensatory
and injunctive relief are similar in litigation and settlement, the
SEC reasons that settlement is typically the more efficient and relia-
ble approach to enforcement.
2. SEC Justifications for Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny Settlements
The SEC responded to Citigroup by defending their settlement
practices generally and the neither-admit-nor-deny policy specifi-
cally. The purpose of the policy at the time of codification was to
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. See also David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1863-66 (2012) (citing fear of loss as one reason to
favor settling).
48. See Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n., The Importance of Trials to
the Law and Public Accountability, Speech before Fifth Annual Judge Thomas A. Flannery
Lecture (Nov. 14, 2013) available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370
540374908#.UolFmy4o7IV.
49. See Khuzami, supra note 44.
50. Id.
51. See id.
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ensure that defendants would not subsequently disavow settlements
and call into question the SEC’s integrity. The modern justification
for the policy is somewhat divorced from that original purpose. To-
day, the SEC argues that if defendants were required to admit to
wrongdoing, many would simply refuse to settle for fear that admis-
sion might expose them to additional lawsuits by private litigants
seeking damages.52 Defendants’ fears are based on two possible
mechanisms. The primary concern of most defendants is that an
admission may have non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel effects
in subsequent private litigation, barring the defendant from taking
a different position or re-litigating the issues surrounding the al-
leged wrongdoing.53 Defendants may also be concerned that an
admission of wrongdoing could be admissible evidence in subse-
quent private litigation.54
a. Collateral Estoppel as a Disincentive for Defendants to Settle
An understanding of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel is
necessary to understanding the rationale behind the SEC’s current
policy. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is largely grounded in
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore.55 In Parklane Hosiery, shareholders and the
SEC brought parallel suits in federal district court, alleging the issu-
ance of a materially false and misleading proxy statement.56 After
the SEC won its case, plaintiffs in the private suit moved for partial
summary judgment, arguing that non-mutual offensive collateral es-
toppel prevented the defendant corporation from re-litigating
issues resolved in the SEC suit.57 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
that no question of fact remained to be determined in a jury trial.58
However, the Court asserted that the use of offensive collateral es-
toppel should be limited. It argued that the application of offensive
collateral estoppel could diminish judicial economy by incentiviz-
ing plaintiffs to litigate against defendants in separate actions, in
52. Id.
53. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 666 (“Of the . . . possible types of harm . . . possible
exposure to collateral estoppel is most feared by large corporations.”).
54. See Posting of John C. Coffee, Jr. to The CLS Blue Sky Blog, http://clsblue
sky.law.columbia.edu/2013/07/22/neither-admit-nor-deny-practical-implications-of-secs-
new-policy (July 22, 2013).
55. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
56. Id. at 329.
57. Id. at 330.
58. See id.
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the hope that a favorable judgment would be binding in all subse-
quent actions.59 The Court also identified several circumstances in
which offensive collateral estoppel would result in unfair treatment
of defendants, including when a defendant has little incentive to
defend vigorously in the first action or when the second action “af-
fords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the
first action that could readily cause a different result.”60
Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent in Parklane Hosiery warned
that the majority’s application of collateral estoppel would pressure
defendants to settle SEC enforcement actions.61 Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that defendants would settle in order to avoid exposure to
private suits brought by individuals seeking to rely on a previous
judgment, as well as to preserve the defendant’s right to re-litigate
issues in private actions.62 His dissent sharply criticized the majority
for crafting a doctrine that would bully defendants to settle with the
SEC, which added “a powerful club to the administrative agencies’
arsenals that even Congress was unwilling to provide them.”63
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent predicted that defendants would set-
tle to avoid application of offensive collateral estoppel, but he did
not address the content of these settlements.64 Settlements contain-
ing an admission of wrongdoing could also be interpreted as
judicial orders entitled to application of offensive collateral estop-
pel.65 Scholars disagree about whether and to what extent collateral
estoppel would apply to admissions in SEC consent decrees. On the
one hand, the doctrine only applies when defendants have had a
“full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution.”66 Unlike the SEC
action in Parklane Hosiery, in which the court entered a declaratory
judgment after a complete trial, consent decrees are settlements
that may not qualify as judicial resolution.67 Even if a court did ap-
ply the collateral estoppel doctrine, the consent decree could fall
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 332.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Marvin G. Pickholz and Richard E. Brodsky, An Assessment of Collateral
Estoppel and SEC Enforcement Proceedings After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 28 AM. UNIV. L.
REV. 37, 60 (1978) (agreeing that Parklane Hosiery will increase defendants’ incentives to
settle).
64. See Parklane Hosiery, supra note 55, at 332.
65. See Coffee, supra note 47.
66. See id. at 328. See also James Moore et al., 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.10
(Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
67. See Coffee, supra note 54. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 Cmt. E
(1982) (setting forth a general rule that settlement agreements do not have collateral estop-
pel effect on subsequent litigation brought by a third party because the issues were not fully
litigated).
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under the procedural unfairness exception if the settlement pro-
cess does not offer the defendant opportunities to conduct full
discovery.68
On the other hand, consent decrees are not simply settlements
between private parties; they are court orders enforced under the
power of a federal or administrative law judge.69 If other judges fol-
low in the footsteps of Judge Rakoff, rather than the Second
Circuit, and demand more information on which to base their ap-
proval of the consent decree, the process will move closer towards
full adjudication.70 If settlement via consent decree resembles full
adjudication, judges in private civil litigations will have a stronger
basis on which to apply collateral estoppel to the judgment. The
possible application of offensive collateral estoppel may incentivize
defendants to refuse to settle, which the SEC claims is a primary
justification for neither-admit-nor-deny.71
b. Evidentiary Effect of Admission as Disincentive
for Defendants to Settle
Even if courts do not apply offensive collateral estoppel to an
admission, defendants may be concerned about the evidentiary ef-
fect of the admission in private litigation.72 This concern is another
important factor in the SEC’s current settlement policy. Courts are
somewhat divided on the question of whether SEC consent decrees
are admissible as evidence. In Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp.,
the Second Circuit held that an SEC consent decree was not the
result of an actual adjudication of any issues, and, therefore, could
not be used as evidence in subsequent litigation.73 The Second Cir-
cuit later declined to extend the Lipsky principle in the case of U.S.
v. Gilbert.74 In Gilbert, the Court held that an SEC consent decree
signed by the defendant was admissible to show that the defendant
68. See 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIG. § 2:108. See also Edmund H. Kerr
Robert J., Collateral Estoppel Implications of SEC Adjudications, 42 BUS. LAWYER 441, 470 (1987)
(stating that the fairness exception may be the only basis for refusing to apply collateral
estoppel to SEC consent decrees in private civil litigation). Other courts have found that the
mere existence of more limited procedures in the first forum is not sufficient, by itself, to
prevent the application of collateral estoppel. Id. at 469.
69. The Supreme Court does not recognize any inherent preference for jury trials over
bench trials. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
460-61 (1977).
70. See Citigroup I, supra note 29, at 336.
71. See Khuzami, supra note 44.
72. See Coffee, supra note 54.
73. Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981).
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knew of certain SEC reporting requirements involved in the terms
of the decree.75 The Gilbert Court based its decision on Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b), which provides that evidence of a wrongful act
“may be admissible for certain purposes, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab-
sence of mistake, or lack of accident.”76 The Court also emphasized
that admitting the decree as evidence was appropriate because “the
decree’s prejudicial potential was not great, and [the lower court]
properly cautioned the jury as to the limited inferences they could
permissibly draw from it.”77 Recent cases have largely followed the
Gilbert approach, admitting the SEC consent decree as evidence if it
constitutes an adjudication of the issues and will not be
prejudicial.78
Under the standard set forth in Gilbert, most courts would likely
grant some evidentiary effect to an admission in a consent decree.79
The value of that evidence in private litigation would depend on
factors such as the claim being brought, the facts of the case, and
the form of adjudication—judge or jury trial, or administrative pro-
ceeding. Notwithstanding these factors, the admission of the
consent decree into evidence would not be legally dispositive of is-
sues in the private cause of action.80 In other words, unlike the
application of offensive collateral estoppel, giving an admission evi-
dentiary effect would not preclude defendants from re-litigating the
issues.81
Although the jurisprudence surrounding the effect of SEC con-
sent decrees is not conclusive, it suggests that admissions would
have an impact on defendants in private litigation, either through
the application of offensive collateral estoppel or as admissible evi-
dence.82 The SEC argues that, because defendants fear this impact,
the Commission must allow neither-admit-nor-deny language to
shield defendants from the consequences of admissions.83 The ab-
sence of an admission offers an additional benefit to the defendant
75. See id.
76. Federal Rule of Evid. 404(b); see also Gilbert, supra note 74, at 97.
77. Gilbert, supra note 74, at 97.
78. See S.E.C. v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt PLC, No. 08-CV-3324, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2010) (citing Gilbert and holding that certain SEC factual findings are admissible evidence in
subsequent litigation and regulatory proceedings) (emphasis added).
79. See Gilbert supra note 74, at 97.
80. See Coffee, supra note 54.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff’s
Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV.
51, 74 (2012); see also Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 00-CV-2838,
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by allowing it to mitigate potential economic and reputational con-
sequences of an admission.84 Although the SEC may also benefit
from obtaining an expeditious settlement, obtaining a settlement
without admission of wrongdoing represents a significant conces-
sion on its part.85
3. SEC’s Modification of Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
Although the SEC responded to Judge Rakoff’s first opinion in
Citigroup by defending its existing settlement policy, the Commis-
sion later modified its blanket policy favoring no-admission
settlements.86 In June 2013, Chairman White promised that the
SEC would take a tougher stance on no-admission settlements.87 In
a September 2013 appearance, she identified the following four
types of cases in which the SEC may require admissions from corpo-
rate or individual defendants: (1) cases where a large number of
investors have been harmed or the conduct was otherwise egre-
gious; (2) cases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the
market or investors; (3) cases where admissions would aid investors
in deciding whether to deal with a particular party in the future;
and (4) cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an im-
portant message to the market about a particular case.88 After
listing these four types of cases, Chairman White reiterated that no-
admission settlements would continue to be the favored method of
enforcement for the SEC.89
Despite Chairman White’s statements, there has been little
meaningful change in the SEC’s approach to enforcement.90 The
Commission only invoked the heightened standard twice in the six
months following Chairman White’s June statement. The first of
the two cases was settled in August 2013 with hedge fund advisor
slip. op. at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2008) (noting the “chilling effect” that allowing SEC find-
ings into evidence in future civil litigation would have on the SEC’s ability to settle cases).
84. See Coffee, supra note 54.
85. See id.
86. See Mary Jo White, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Deploying the Full Enforce-
ment Arsenal, Speech at Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference (Sept. 26, 2013)
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202#.UlxZdS7D_
IU.
87. See James B. Steward, SEC Has Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, NEW YORK
TIMES, June 21, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/business/secs-new-
chief-promises-tougher-line-on-cases.html?_r=0.
88. See White, supra note 86.
89. See id.
90. See Posting of John C. Coffee, Jr. to The CLS Blue Sky Blog, http://clsbluesky.law
.columbia.edu/2013/10/10/in-the-wake-of-the-whale-whats-changed (Oct. 10, 2013).
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Philip Falcone and his advisory firm, Harbinger Capital Partners.91
The SEC’s complaint alleged that Falcone improperly used $113
million in fund assets to pay his personal taxes, made secret deals
favoring particular customer redemptions, and manipulated the
bond market.92 In addition to an $18 million fine and a five-year bar
from the securities industry, Falcone admitted in the settlement to
acting recklessly and to a list of facts related to the conduct.93 He
did not, however, directly admit to violating any specific rules or
federal securities laws.94
In the second case to apply the modified approach, JP Morgan
agreed in September 2013 to pay a $920 million penalty to four
agencies, including the SEC.95 The cause of action resulted from a
$6.2 billion derivatives trading loss managed by one of its traders,
nicknamed “The London Whale.”96 The settlement included an ad-
mission, but only to violations of the non-scienter-based books-and-
records provision under Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.97 Most practitioners consider violations of this corpo-
rate governance provision to be minor as compared to violations of
anti-fraud provisions like Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,98 which requires proof of intentional or reckless mis-
conduct.99 The negotiated settlement allowed the SEC to claim a
political victory, while JP Morgan avoided admission of any serious
wrongdoing.100
91. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Press Release, Philip Falcone and Harbinger Capital
Agree to Settlement, http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539
780222#.UlyV8y7D_IU (Aug. 19, 2013).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Marc D. Powers, et al., The Falcone Settlement: A Harbinger of Things to Come?, http://
www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/261910/Financial+Services/The+Falcone+Settlement+A+
Harbinger+Of+Things+To+Come (Sept. 11, 2013).
95. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Expected to Admit Fault in ‘London
Whale’ Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2013, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/10/15/jpmorgan-said-to-reach-deal-with-trading-regulator.
96. Id.
97. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (requiring a company to
ensure that its records “accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer.”).
98. The agency commonly brings actions under § 10(b) and its corollary provision SEC
Rule 10(b)-5, both which require proof of scienter.
99. See Kevin LaCroix, A Closer Look at JP Morgan’s $920 Million ‘London Whale’ Regulatory
Settlements, Sept. 20, 2013 available at http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/securi-
ties-litigation/a-closer-look-at-jp-morgans-920-million-london-whale-regulatory-settlements/
(citing various practitioners who argue § 13 violations are not as serious as fraud-based
violations).
100. See Dan Freed, ‘Historic’ Admission to SEC Won’t Help JP Morgan Plaintiffs, http://www
.thestreet.com/story/12042919/1/historic-admission-to-sec-wont-help-jpmorgan-plaintiffs
.html (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:12 AM).
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In October 2013, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) notably settled with JP Morgan over the same massive trad-
ing losses. Unlike the SEC, the CFTC settlement required JP
Morgan to admit to “recklessly employing manipulative devices,” in
addition to paying about $100 million in fines.101 Although the
CFTC settlement focused on misconduct in actual trading prac-
tices, the precise language could protect the bank from an
onslaught of shareholder litigation.102 JP Morgan has noted that it
admitted to the wrongful conduct, but it neither admitted nor de-
nied the CFTC’s legal conclusion that there was a violation.103
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE
NEITHER-ADMIT-NOR-DENY POLICY
A. Problems with the SEC’s Old Approach to Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
The old approach to neither-admit-nor-deny resulted in the SEC
settling an overwhelming majority of its cases without an admission
of wrongdoing. This approach remains the SEC’s preferred prac-
tice despite failing to meet its core objectives.104 First, the old policy
lacks transparency. By taking very few cases to trial, the SEC relin-
quishes the openness of the litigation process.105 Arguments at trial
reveal and publicize facts uncovered after thorough discovery by
both parties. Furthermore, court hearings are often open to the
public and often result in a published judicial opinion explaining
the decision.106 This openness informs the public at large about in-
terpretation of the laws, the rights of victims, and the nature of the
claims.107 Settlement by the SEC, however, curtails this process.
Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit has criticized settlement for
replacing a “full trial record that may more accurately represent the
101. Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 95.
102. See id.
103. Ben Protess, A Regulator Cuts New Teeth on JP Morgan in ‘London Whale’ Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/jpmorgan-to-
pay-100-million-and-make-admission-of-wrongdoing-in-london-whale-pact.
104. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 404 (2010) (noting former Chairman Khuzami altered the
Division of Enforcement’s performance metrics to emphasize “quality, timeliness and deter-
rent impact” rather than simply the number of cases initiated).
105. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1662 (2005).
106. See Johnson, supra note 7.
107. Id. See also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)
(“Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values.”).
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complexity and ambiguity of life” with facts that are only “pleaded,
stipulated, or inferred.”108
Although settlement is less transparent than adjudication, not all
settlements are equally opaque.109 Parties to a settlement may
choose how to conduct the settlement process and draft the agree-
ment, as long as the settlement meets minimum standards of
legality and reasonableness.110 The SEC embraces a settlement pol-
icy that is highly opaque. Negotiation of an SEC consent decree is
frequently beyond public record. Therefore, only the negotiating
parties know the factors on which a settlement is based and the
extent to which each party compromised on settlement terms.111
The SEC’s private negotiations with defendants result in a brief Or-
der Instituting Proceeding, typically no more than a few paragraphs
long, listing the allegations and terms of settlement.112 This notice
contains only a small part of the complete set of facts and allega-
tions uncovered by the SEC’s investigation.113 Furthermore, the
absence of an admission means that the allegations contained in
the consent decree are simply allegations, and, therefore, they can-
not be afforded any certainty as to their truth.114
Public policy favors an opaque settlement process when two pri-
vate parties negotiate a compromise that has no impact on third
parties and does not require agreement on facts.115 Yet the benefits
of private settlement cannot be inferred in the arena of settlement
with a public agency.116 Unlike most private settlements, SEC settle-
ments demand transparency because of their impact on third
108. See White, supra note 48 (describing Judge Wald’s support of trial).
109. See Johnson, supra note 7 (quoting David Luban as stating “We cannot really be
against settlements . . . . But we can be against the wrong settlements.” Luban argues that the
“wrong” settlements are those that are secret.).
110. Id.
111. See Coffee, supra note 54.
112. See also Litigation, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n website (May 30, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml (providing links to notices and orders concerning
settlements).
113. See id.
114. See Citigroup I, supra note 29, at 334 (stating that an allegation that is neither admit-
ted nor denied “has no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel effect,” and that the
public “has [no] reason to credit those allegations, which remain entirely unproven.”).
115. See Citigroup I, supra note 29.
116. Macchiarola, supra note 83 (stating that public accountability through no-admission
settlements may be more elusive). The neither-admit-nor-deny settlement is similar in many
ways to a nolo contendere plea in the criminal setting. The Department of Justice has long
discouraged use of the nolo contendere plea. A 1953 DOJ directive reflects the agency’s
approach to the use of nolo contendere: “Uncontrolled use of the plea has led to shockingly
low sentences and insignificant fines that are no deterrent to crime. Moreover, a person
permitted to plead nolo contendere admits his guilt for the purpose of imposing punishment
for his acts and yet, for all other purposes, and as far as the public is concerned, persists in his
denial of wrongdoing. It is no wonder that the public regards consent to such a plea by the
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parties. SEC settlements influence market participants, affect the
development of securities law, and implicate public financial mar-
kets that are interconnected with societal interests.117 A 2010
settlement between the SEC and Goldman Sachs, in which
Goldman admitted to materially misleading investors, sent
Goldman’s stock price up nearly ten percent the day after settle-
ment.118 The Goldman settlement suggests that when the SEC
resolves charges against public companies, investors respond.
Greater transparency in the resolution would better inform inves-
tors’ decision-making.119 Investment experts generally agree that
the SEC would “best serve investors by focusing on making data
more accessible, not limiting the amount.”120
Not only does lack of transparency fail to hold defendants fully
accountable for wrongful conduct, but it also fails to hold the SEC
accountable for its settlement practices. Under the current policy,
the SEC has no minimum standard to meet with regards to settle-
ment terms or burdens of proof, other than the standard of fairness
and reasonableness theoretically imposed by judges.121 Therefore,
the policy gives the Commission expansive authority to prioritize
efficiency over obtaining an admission of wrongdoing.122 The SEC
may easily and expeditiously obtain settlements, but those settle-
ments may not make sense given the severity of the crime or the
evidentiary basis for the allegations.123
One way in which the neither-admit-nor-deny policy fails to hold
the SEC accountable is by permitting the SEC to offer no-admission
settlements even when its case is weak. In 2005, the SEC brought
Government as an admission that it has only a technical case at most and that the whole
proceeding is just a fiasco.” Ronald J. Waldron et al., The Criminal Justice System: An Introduc-
tion, 229 (CRC Publishing 2009).
117. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 652.
118. Walter Hamilton et al., Goldman Sachs Agrees to Settle SEC Fraud Case for $550 Million,
L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/15/business/la-fi-
0716-goldman-sec-20100716.
119. See Johnson, supra note 7.
120. Eleanor Bloxham, Do Investors Have Too Much Information?, CNN Money, available at
http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/10/29/investor-information-overload-sec/ (quoting Laura
Berry, executive of an investor coalition).
121. See Citigroup I, supra note 29 (holding that district courts should not inquire into the
truthfulness of the allegations in approving a consent decree). See also Becker, supra note 47
(stating that while working in the Division of Enforcement, he noticed a “tendency at times
to want to dispose of a matter,” resulting in the SEC giving defendants “a settlement discount
to avoid litigation.”).
122. See also Posting of John C. Coffee, Jr. to The CLS Blue Sky Blog, http://clsbluesky
.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-has-gone-wrong (Jan. 2, 2013) (argu-
ing that the SEC favors “quick, publicity generating settlements”).
123. See Coffee, supra note 54.
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sweeping charges against executives from telecommunications com-
pany Qwest, seeking $300 million for what it called “massive
financial fraud.”124 The SEC later “quietly agreed” to a no-admission
settlement, which one attorney for the defendant said was an “indi-
cation of the merits of [the SEC’s] case.”125 Settlements based on
minimal evidence inspire little confidence in the SEC. Had the
Commission been required to obtain an admission of wrongdoing,
it would have been compelled to either build a case with actual
merit or drop the charges. The trade-offs involved in obtaining set-
tlements raise serious concerns about the SEC’s use of its broad
discretion in a process lacking transparency.126
These accountability concerns are aggravated by the likelihood
of unequal bargaining power in such negotiations. Relatively equal
bargaining power between parties is a hallmark of traditional settle-
ment.127 This standard is difficult to meet when applied to
settlement negotiations between individuals or corporations and
government entities.128 An ABA Task Force Report found that al-
though both parties in an SEC settlement have a number of sources
of power in the negotiation, the SEC typically has the upper
hand.129 For example, one source of power that may embolden the
SEC is its perceived relationship with Congress or the Department
of Justice.130 Although the use of these relationships as a source of
bargaining power would be difficult to eliminate from the SEC set-
tlement process, greater transparency and higher standards of
accountability would limit the ability of either party to negotiate
based on factors unrelated to the merits of each individual case.
Lastly, the SEC’s old approach fails to sufficiently deter potential
wrongdoers. In its effort to settle cases rapidly, notwithstanding an
124. Andy Vuong, SEC Settlement Comes at “Low Cost” to Nacchio, DENVER POST, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_16016370.
125. Id. (quoting Kevin Evans, an attorney for co-defendant and former Qwest account-
ant James Kowlowski).
126. In a letter to Senator Warren, Chairman White admitted that the SEC has never
conducted any macro analysis of the trade-offs to the public of settling without an admission
of guilt or wrongdoing and going forward with litigation. See Letter from Chairman Mary Jo
White to Senator Elizabeth Warren, supra note 5.
127. Johnson, supra note 7, at 658-59.
128. See id. at 659. Judges may reject proposed settlements if they perceive unequal bar-
gaining power between two private parties. Although SEC consent decrees undergo judicial
review as well, judges almost never scrutinize or reject the proposed settlement.
129. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA Task Force on SEC Settle-
ments, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1087, 1098 (1992)
(stating that the SEC dominates most settlement negotiations).
130. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 659 (listing various factors that affect negotiating power,
including wealth, authority, strength, persuasion, capacity, influence, a willingness to engage
in conflict, and other less visible factors).
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admission of wrongdoing, the SEC reduces deterrent effect.131 In
Judge Rakoff’s first opinion in Citigroup, he noted that because po-
tential wrongdoers know that they will not have to admit to
unlawful conduct, a consent decree is “frequently viewed by compa-
nies as a cost of doing business.”132 Under neither-admit-nor-deny,
defendants may anticipate that the SEC will not require them to
publicly acknowledge wrongdoing or litigate cases.133 Accordingly,
they know that resolving an SEC action will require limited expen-
diture of resources and reputational risk.134 Senator Elizabeth
Warren is another vocal critic of this settlement approach, particu-
larly as it applies to Wall Street Banks. After a Senate Banking
Committee Hearing in which none of the major financial regula-
tors could recall the last time they faced a major bank in trial,
Senator Warren expressed concern that “Too Big to Fail” had be-
come “Too Big for Trial.”135
Compensatory penalties imposed by the SEC may deter some po-
tential wrongdoers. However, the fact that many members of the
corporate community consider SEC settlements to be a cost of busi-
ness suggests that these settlements do not impose a sufficiently
severe punishment to meaningfully deter wrongful conduct.136
Under a more forceful approach, defendants could no longer rely
on simply paying a fine to resolve an SEC action. Instead, they
would have to structure their conduct knowing that they might face
the consequences of an admission, including reputational harm.137
Admissions would supplement monetary and injunctive penalties to
send a message to potential wrongdoers that an SEC action has, at
minimum, the punitive consequences of an admission. Further-
more, potential wrongdoers would have to consider the legitimate
possibility that the SEC might litigate the case. Even SEC Commis-
sioner Luis Aguilar admits that the SEC “must be willing to litigate”
as proof to potential wrongdoers that the Commission can and will
131. See Coffee, supra note 54.
132. Citigroup I, supra note 29, at 335.
133. See id.
134. See Coffee, supra note 2 (arguing that corporate defendants do not fear the SEC’s
enforcement because, “once the public has been shown the little man behind the curtain,
the great and powerful Wizard looks far less foreboding or impressive”).
135. See Senator Elizabeth Warren’s First Banking Committee Hearing, Senator Elizabeth
Warren, Hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren, YOUTUBE, Feb. 14, 2013 available at https://www
.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=dxhyUAWPmGw.
136. See Citigroup I, supra note 29, at 335.
137. See Coffee, supra note 2.
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wield this enforcement tool.138 A willingness to litigate would com-
pel potential wrongdoers to weigh the additional costs of trial
before violating the federal securities laws.
B. Problems with the SEC’s Modified Approach to
Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny
The SEC’s modified approach to neither-admit-nor-deny identi-
fies four triggering factors for admissions under the modified
policy: (1) cases where a large number of investors have been
harmed or the conduct was otherwise egregious; (2) cases where
the conduct posed a significant risk to the market or investors;
(3) cases where admissions would aid investors in deciding whether
to deal with a particular party in the future; and (4) cases where
reciting unambiguous facts would send an important message to
the market about a particular case.139 This modified approach fails
to effectuate the core principles of transparency, accountability,
and deterrence. First, the modified policy does not establish with
any certainty that the SEC will in fact take a more aggressive stance
in settlements.140 These four factors—which may, but will not neces-
sarily, lead to more admissions—are ambiguous, difficult to apply,
and afford too much discretion to the SEC.141 Interpreted broadly,
almost any SEC action could fall within the standard since the Com-
mission pursues many actions where multiple investors have been
harmed or a company is well-known in the public markets. Inter-
preted narrowly, the SEC may find that a securities violation is
seldom egregious enough to require settlement.142
The Commission’s settlement with SAC Capital Advisors in Octo-
ber 2013 illustrates the deficiencies of the modified approach.143
The agreement between the SEC and SAC Capital represented the
largest settlement ever for insider trading charges.144 Although SAC
Capital agreed to pay the SEC a total of over $2 billion in penalties,
the firm did not admit or deny any wrongdoing in the civil settle-
ment.145 As compared to the settlements with Harbinger Capital
138. Aguilar, supra note 5.
139. Id.
140. See White, supra note 86.
141. See Coffee, supra note 54.
142. See id.
143. Michael Rothfield & Juliet Chung, Prosecutors and SAC Head Toward a Possible Record-
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and JP Morgan,146 the massive fraud at issue in the SAC Capital case
should have qualified for a required admission under the SEC’s
heightened standard. Instead, the SEC reflexively settled without an
admission of guilt. Only one month later, SAC Capital pled guilty to
charges of criminal fraud in a $1.8 billion settlement with federal
prosecutors.147 The criminal plea further illustrates fundamental
shortcomings of the SEC’s enforcement policy, under which perpe-
trators of fraud rising to a criminal level may not be required to
admit wrongdoing in a civil settlement with the SEC.148 One expla-
nation for the no-admission settlement may be that the SEC works
backwards in applying the modified approach, declining to require
admissions if it believes the defendant may choose to litigate in-
stead. Such reasoning would render the four triggering factors
relatively meaningless, since the SEC would base its application of
the modified standard on its fear of trial rather than those four
factors.
Admittedly, the SEC has always maintained discretion over deci-
sions to bring and settle cases.149 Yet the Commission’s discretion
when acting in the public interest is not absolute or unrestricted.150
The current check on this expansive authority is the requirement
that courts exercise independent judgment in approving the settle-
ment.151 An even more effective approach to ensure fair and
consistent treatment of wrongdoers would involve the SEC self-im-
posing specific guidelines on its settlement practices. By setting
minimum standards for settlement and limiting the ad hoc applica-
tion of the standards, the SEC could avoid reverting back to its old
approach of never requiring admissions.
In addition, the modified approach fails to address, and even am-
plifies, the collateral estoppel problems that disincentivized
admissions under the old policy. Under the old approach, the
neither-admit-nor-deny provision typically precluded the settlement
from having collateral estoppel effects in private litigation.152 If the
SEC requires admissions in the types of cases it claims to target
under the modified approach, such as those where harm is wide-
spread or egregious, those admissions would have devastating
146. See discussion, Part II.
147. See Jonathan Weil, SAC Capital’s Guilty Plea Makes Old Deal Look Silly, Nov 6, 2013
10:18 AM ET, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-06/sac-capital-s-guilty-
plea-makes-old-deal-look-silly.html.
148. See id.
149. See White, supra note 48.
150. See id.
151. See Citigroup II, supra note 26, at 294.
152. See supra notes 55–71 (discussing the possible application of offensive collateral es-
toppel to SEC consent decrees).
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collateral estoppel effects.153 Defendants would likely respond by re-
fusing to settle.154 Thus, the heightened standard will likely force
the SEC to litigate matters that are particularly difficult and expen-
sive to try.155
Because the collateral consequences of an admission are often
worse for individuals than companies, individuals will likely be
more reluctant to admit wrongdoing under the modified policy.156
Individuals who admit to violations of the federal securities laws can
lose their license to work in the financial industry or can face public
humiliation.157 Individuals also risk losing their Directors’ and Of-
ficers’ Liability (D&O) insurance if they admit to fraud or
intentional misconduct.158 D&O insurance is an important tool
used by companies to protect their directors and managers against
the costs of litigation.159 The admissions sought by the SEC would
likely trigger exceptions in the payment schemes of these insurance
policies.160 Given the costs of admission, individuals charged under
the new policy will typically take their chances at trial, regardless of
the settlement offer.161
If the SEC wants to avoid excessively high trial costs under the
modified policy, there are several options it may apply. Each one,
however, is problematic. First, the Commission could use its discre-
tion to apply the modified approach infrequently and only when it
knows that it will not have to go to trial. The inconsistent applica-
tion of the heightened standard thus far suggests the SEC may
prefer this option. Infrequent application of the modified ap-
proach and the absence of a legitimate threat of litigation would
fail to wholly address the problems of transparency, accountability,
and deterrence that persisted under the old approach.162
Second, the SEC may require admissions only from wrongdoers
who have perpetrated the very worst financial crimes and have al-
ready been criminally convicted. Requiring admissions only “from
the Madoffs, WorldComs, and Enrons of financial wrongdoing . . .
153. See Alison Frankel, Should Defendants Fear New SEC Policy on Admissions in Settlements?




156. See Lindsay Fisher, D&O Insurance: The Tension Between Cooperating with the Insurance
Company and Protecting Privileged Information from Third Party Plaintiffs, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
201, 209 (2008).
157. Becker, supra note 47.
158. See Frankel, supra note 153.
159. Fisher, supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See discussion, Part III.A.
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[would not] have much impact” though, because it would not re-
present a significant departure from the SEC’s current policy.163
Since 2011, the SEC has claimed to require admissions of wrongdo-
ing in cases where the defendant admits to or has been convicted of
a parallel criminal violation.164 Scholars have noted that this claim is
largely insignificant, requiring admissions in only a small subset of
cases in which the defendant already admitted to or was proven
guilty of the wrongdoing.165 Should the SEC require admissions in
such cases, under the guise of a modified approach, the change
would be as insignificant as the 2011 policy exception.
Third, the SEC could aggressively pursue admissions, but care-
fully craft the settlement language in a way that dilutes an
admission’s significance. By drafting the settlement to avoid impli-
cating specific or serious violations, the SEC can claim a public
relations victory without achieving true accountability for the
wrongdoing committed.166 Moreover, if the SEC were to require ad-
missions in egregious cases, it would be meaningless for the
defendant to admit to only lesser charges.167 For example, under
the theory of the modified approach, the SEC believed JP Morgan’s
wrongdoing in the London Whale case was so harmful as to justify
requiring an admission.168 Yet it seems unlikely that the books-and-
records violation to which the SEC required JP Morgan to admit
was actually the wrongdoing that triggered the modified policy.169
As compared to the allegations of fraud, it seems equally unlikely
that the books-and-records violation is the wrongdoing about which
the public cares.170
163. Frankel, supra note 153.
164. See Khuzami, supra note 44.
165. Lynndon Groff, Is Too Big to Fail Too Big to Confess?: Scrutinizing the SEC’s “No-Admit”
Consent Judgment Proposals, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1727, 1744 (2013).
166. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, As JPMorgan Settles Up, Shareholders Are Hit Anew, Sept. 23,
2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/as-jpmorgan-settles-up-shareholders-are-
hit-anew/?_r=0NY (quoting John Coffee as saying the Commission often settles because it
“desperately needs a victory. . . . that [it] can celebrate”).
167. Id.
168. See Protess & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 95.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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III. PROPOSED REFORM TO NEITHER-ADMIT-NOR-DENY
A. Repeal of 17 CFR Section 202.5 and Adoption of the
“Mandatory Admission” Policy
An effective solution to the problems presented by neither-admit-
nor-deny must achieve several goals. First, the new policy must im-
prove the transparency, accountability, and deterrent effect of SEC
enforcement actions. Second, it must address the collateral estop-
pel concerns that have impeded the SEC’s ability to obtain
admissions. Third, it must achieve the first two goals in a systematic
manner that limits the SEC’s discretion, ensuring that the Commis-
sion applies the new standard consistently.
This Note proposes a repeal of neither-admit-nor-deny and adop-
tion of a new regulation, called the “Mandatory Admission Rule.”
More specifically, this Note urges the SEC to replace 17 CFR Sec-
tion 202.5(e) with a rule that (1) requires every defendant entering
into a settlement with the SEC to admit to violations of specific fed-
eral securities laws and (2) prohibits the admission from being
given collateral estoppel effect in actions not involving the SEC.171
The first provision of the Mandatory Admission Rule establishes
the unambiguous minimum requirement of an admission for the
resolution of SEC claims via settlement. If a defendant refuses to
admit to wrongdoing, then the SEC must weigh public interest con-
siderations, agency resource limitations, and the circumstances of
the case to decide whether to litigate or drop the case. Although
this decision involves trade-offs, it will lead to more transparent res-
olution, greater accountability for the SEC, and a stronger
deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers who will face more serious
consequences when the SEC brings suit.172
171. Courts are not bound to follow SEC regulations. Therefore, under the proposed
reform, they would not be statutorily required to limit the collateral estoppel effect of an
admission in a subsequent private action. However, courts defer to the language of the con-
sent decree and the intentions of the parties when making determinations about the
application of collateral estoppel. Therefore, the proposed reform will still have the desired
effect in subsequent private actions. See e.g., New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries, 16
F. Supp. 2d 460, 473 (D.N.J. 1998) aff’d, 197 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The clear words of the
[consent order] itself preclude reliance upon [it] as evidence of liability”); Kramas v. Security
Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1982) (excluding a consent decree that “con-
tained a recitation that it did not constitute evidence of wrongdoing.”); In re Chinnery, 181
B.R. 954, 960-61 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating parties’ intentions as set forth in the settle-
ment agreement are key to determining whether a consent judgment collaterally estops a
party from re-litigating a factual issue already resolved).
172. See infra Part IV.B and IV.C.
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The second provision of the Mandatory Admission Rule mitigates
the forceful approach of the first provision by prohibiting the appli-
cation of offensive collateral estoppel to admissions. Under the
Mandatory Admission Rule, a defendant may settle an SEC claim
with an admission and retain the right to take a different position
in subsequent private litigation. There are a number of reasons that
a defendant may choose to adopt this approach. For example, the
individual or company may want to dispose of an SEC claim quickly
and with minimal media attention; they may believe that the costs
of an admission are worth bearing; or they may have an incentive to
fight harder in trial, either because the stakes are higher or because
evidence uncovered during discovery strengthened the defendant’s
case.173 By eliminating an admission’s preclusive effect, the
Mandatory Admission Rule removes a significant disincentive to set-
tlement and allows the SEC to avoid being overwhelmed by
litigation with defendants refusing to settle due to collateral estop-
pel concerns.174
This proposed reform does not attempt to change the jurispru-
dence with respect to admissibility of SEC consent decrees as
evidence in private litigation. As previously noted, courts will likely
allow the admission to have some evidentiary effect in subsequent
litigation.175 At the present time, there is no way of predicting
whether this evidentiary issue will have an empirically significant
impact on defendants refusing to settle. However, the incentive to
refuse settlement is far less than if the admission is given preclusive
effect. If an admission is admitted as evidence, defendants retain
the right to refute the plaintiff’s evidence.176 Furthermore, if courts
apply the Gilbert standard, under which judges assess the prejudicial
potential of the consent decree and may caution the jury to limit
the inferences it draws from the decree, the courts may mitigate the
concerns of some defendants that their admission could be disposi-
tive in litigation.177 The Mandatory Admission Rule declines to
affect the admissibility of admissions, instead focusing on the prob-
lem of offensive collateral estoppel.
Although the Mandatory Admission Rule will apply to all SEC
actions, its implications will differ based on the federal securities
173. See e.g., Isaacson v. California Insurance Guarantee Association, 44 Cal.3d 775, 794
(1988); Charles B. Pitts Real Estate, Inc. v. Hater, 602 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla.App. 1992) (“[T]here
were many logical and practical reasons for the [defendants] to pay $540,000 to settle that
case, even if they believed they could ultimately prevail in that lawsuit.”).
174. See infra Part IV.C.
175. See discussion Part I.D.
176. See Coffee, supra note 54.
177. See supra notes 72-76.
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laws involved. For example, the SEC frequently brings actions
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
under corollary provisions in SEC Rule 10(b)-5.178 Both Section
10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 place broad prohibitions on securities
fraud and provide a private right of action.179 In order to establish a
claim under these provisions, both the SEC and private plaintiffs
must prove scienter.180 An admission in a settlement with the SEC
could serve as valuable evidence of scienter in a private right of
action. The defendant would be entitled to introduce evidence to
rebut the claim, notwithstanding the settlement. In contrast, an-
other key anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws is
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.181 The provision closely
tracks Rule 10(b)-5, but requires proof of mere negligence rather
than scienter.182 Even if an admission of wrongdoing under Section
17 is admissible as evidence in private litigation, the plaintiff would
still have to meet a higher standard of mens rea in a scienter-based
fraud claim.
B. Advantages of the Mandatory Admission Rule
A blanket policy that requires specific admissions of wrongdoing
in SEC settlements would advance the Commission’s interests in
transparency, accountability, and deterrence. Settlement negotia-
tions would still be private and afford discretion to the SEC, but
specific admissions would force defendants to undergo a public
shaming process and shed light on the conduct at issue.183 Even if
defendants respond to the Mandatory Admission Rule by refusing
to settle, transparency will improve. In that case, the SEC would be
justified in filing more aggressive and candid complaints that are
not the product of a quiet plea bargain.184 In either case, the public
will be far more informed than under the current policy. Such in-
formation aligns the public’s understanding of the wrongful
conduct, the charges brought, and the resolution. The public can
then use this information to respond in the securities market or to
express approval or disapproval of the SEC’s practices.
178. § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. § 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
182. See id.
183. See White, supra note 48.
184. See Coffee, supra note 54.
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The Mandatory Admission Rule may result in more trials if de-
fendants refuse to settle and the SEC chooses to litigate at least
some of those cases. A greater willingness to resolve cases at trial
would mark a significant and positive shift towards more trans-
parency and greater deterrence in SEC enforcement practices. The
effectiveness of the policy depends at least in part on the ability of
the SEC to win at trial. In 2012, the Commission prevailed in ninety-
five percent of the cases it litigated.185 If the SEC pursues cases in
which its claims are based on strong and convincing evidence of
wrongdoing, the Commission can maintain this rate of success
under the proposed reform. Courtroom wins, particularly in key
cases, would further improve the SEC’s credibility. Not only would
winning trials deter wrongful behavior, but it would also give the
SEC a stronger bargaining position in future settlement negotia-
tions. When faced with the prospect of trial against an opponent
with an impressive success rate of close to ninety-five percent, de-
fendants would be incentivized to settle.186
Although the Mandatory Admission Rule would place limitations
on the SEC’s settlement options, it provides minimum guidelines
for settlements and limits the Commission’s expansive discretion.187
Under the rule, the SEC’s alternatives to settlement are litigation or
dropping the case. Faced with this choice, the SEC must seriously
evaluate the strength of its case and the importance of the issue to
the public interest.  The rule therefore constrains the ability of the
SEC to obtain slap-on-the-wrist settlements with mild terms. The
policy holds the SEC to a higher standard that promotes thorough
investigation and pursuit of quality claims based on strong evi-
dence. Within these constraints, the SEC would continue to
maintain discretion over which cases to pursue and how to allocate
resources between them.
C. Trade-offs of the Mandatory Admission Rule
This proposed reform is not without trade-offs. Critics will likely
point to the risks and costs of increased litigation with defendants
185. See Aguilar, supra note 5 (stating that the SEC won in 21 out of 22 trials in fiscal year
2012).
186. See Thomas Gorman, SEC Actions Blog, http://www.secactions.com/#sthash.prLES
Dy0.dpuf (Sept. 23, 2013).
187. See supra notes 127–130.
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refusing to settle under the admissions requirement.188 Admittedly,
the SEC will likely have to drop some cases and devote more re-
sources to each case it does pursue under the Mandatory Admission
Rule. However, the trade-off will encourage greater quality in en-
forcement practices. Under the current policy, the Commission
may bring actions based on minimal evidence, knowing that it will
not have to prove wrongdoing at trial because the defendant will
likely settle the case.189 Although the corporations and individuals
subject to SEC scrutiny rarely elicit sympathy, justice requires that
punishment follow proof of wrongdoing. Under the Mandatory Ad-
mission Rule, the SEC will face the legitimate possibility of
litigation. The Commission must expend its resources pursuing
those cases that have a strong evidentiary basis and that will serve
the public’s interest. Although the Mandatory Admission Rule may
involve tradeoffs with respect to the number of cases brought and
settled, it will encourage the SEC to prioritize quality over quantity
in enforcement.
Increased litigation may be more likely when the defendant is an
individual, as opposed to a company. As previously noted, individu-
als who admit to violations of the securities laws may face severe
collateral consequences, including industry bars and reputational
harm.190 Critics may also argue that because admitting to violations
of securities laws often bars D&O claims, individuals will forgo set-
tlement and take their chances at trial. Yet, it is also possible that
individuals with D&O insurance may contract for different terms in
their insurance agreements to avoid triggering an exception. Schol-
ars criticize the current regime of D&O insurance for providing
insufficient loss prevention services and litigation defense cost man-
agement.191 An ancillary advantage to the Mandatory Admission
Rule could be improvements in the operation of the D&O insur-
ance market and the broader scheme of enforcement.
Other critics may argue that the Mandatory Admission Rule goes
beyond the scope of the SEC’s mandate. These commentators may
believe that the SEC’s fundamental task is to regulate the securities
188. See Frankel supra note 153 (stating that where the SEC requires admissions, “too
many SEC resources going to a small number of cases in which the agency is demanding
admissions . . . will significantly undercut the entire enforcement program”).
189. See Macchiarola, supra note 83.
190. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545 (2006) (noting difficulties in differentiating
between insurance for corporations, corporate directors, and officers).
191. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Direc-
tors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1808-1817 (2007).
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market, and the Division of Enforcement’s primary role is reme-
dial.192 According to such reasoning, requiring admissions is a
punitive approach associated more often with the Department of
Justice than a civil administrative body.193 This argument fails to ac-
count for the unique history and responsibilities of the SEC.
Historically, the SEC did not consider recovering damages for in-
jured investors to be an important part of its mission, attributing
that function to private securities class actions.194 Although the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gave the SEC a more prominent role in
compensating investors, the Commission’s goals have always fo-
cused on punishing wrongdoers, deterring potential wrongdoers,
and protecting investors.195 The SEC’s mandate clearly extends be-
yond simply remedying harmed investors, and the Mandatory
Admission Rule aims to better achieve this existing mandate.
Critics may also believe that allowing defendants to take a contra-
dictory position in future litigation threatens the integrity of the
SEC’s settlement process. However, this reasoning is rarely cited by
the SEC to support its modern enforcement approaches.196 Further-
more, if the outcome of private litigation differs from the SEC
settlement, it would not necessarily compromise the validity of the
SEC’s claim. As previously described, settlement and trial may rea-
sonably lead to different outcomes, because incentives and available
information differ in each process. To the extent that the outcome
does raise skepticism about the SEC’s settlement practices, this
skepticism may be an appropriate check on the SEC’s authority. If
defendants are able to easily and routinely rebut the evidence of
their admission in subsequent litigation, these consequences may
signal to the SEC that it needs to improve its enforcement practices.
Finally, critics may argue that the Mandatory Admission Rule will
lead to less compensatory relief for victims if the SEC lowers penal-
ties in order to obtain admissions of wrongdoing. Requiring
admissions and exposing defendants to disadvantageous private liti-
gation may be factors in the settlement negotiation and may dwarf




194. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be A Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 Bus.
Law. 317, 318 (2008).
195. See id. Section 308 (the “Fair Fund provision”) of Sarbanes-Oxley gives the SEC a
larger role in compensating investors. After the passage of the Act, the SEC stated that it
“intend[ed] to use [Section 308] whenever reasonably possible, consistent with its mission to
protect investors.” (emphasis added)
196. See Vitesse, supra note 11, at 309.
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the SEC’s recovery.197 Yet, a substantial amount of compensation
for harmed investors comes from private litigation, not SEC en-
forcement actions.198 The monetary penalties obtained in SEC
settlements are typically divided between the U.S Treasury general
fund and a “fair fund” set up to compensate harmed investors.199
Investors often only receive a small percentage, either because the
administrative costs of distribution are too high or it is too difficult
to identify the victims.200 Even if investors do receive funds, the re-
covery is typically much lower than their losses.201 Although the
Mandatory Admission Rule may lead to a reduction in the compen-
sation that investors receive from the SEC, it would not impede
their ability to recover damages through private actions.
CONCLUSION
The SEC’s neither-admit-nor-deny policy has been widely dis-
cussed among legal scholars and practitioners, particularly since
Judge Rakoff’s first Citigroup opinion in 2011. Although many peo-
ple agree that the policy needs reform, there are differing views
about how this should be done. This Note urges the SEC to take the
meaningful and unambiguous step of repealing neither-admit-nor-
deny. In its place, the SEC should enact a rule that (1) requires
every defendant entering into a settlement with the SEC to admit to
violations of specific federal securities laws and (2) prohibits the
admission from receiving collateral estoppel effect in actions not
involving the SEC. This sweeping reform would strike a balance be-
tween resolving enforcement actions in a way that best serves the
public interest and awarding due respect to the discretion and in-
herent limitations of the SEC.
197. See Frankel, supra note 153.
198. See Johnson, supra note 7.
199. Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1103, 1127 (2008).
200. Id. See also Tony Chappelle, Where Does All the Settlement Money Go? Maybe Not Where You
Think Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (Nov. 1, 2002), http://
securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2002/20021101_Headline09_Chapelle.htm.
201. See e.g., Adoption of Amendments to the Rules of Practice and Delegations of Au-
thority of the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49412, 66 FED. REG. 13,166, 13,173
(2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 201, 240) (stating that, under the Fair Fund provision,
investors “are more likely to be made whole”); James D. Cox et. al., S.E.C Enforcement Heuris-
tics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 755 (2003)  (“It is unlikely that profit
disgorgements generated by the Fair Fund provision can be expected to displace private
recoveries in many situations.”).
